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Abstract 
This paper proposes analogical mapping as a strategy for data analysis. Research is often messy. 
Where it explores the unknown and follows unexpected paths it often generates unanticipated 
findings. Presented with extensive data and the initial analysis describing 'themes' the researcher 
asks, "What does it all mean?" Thus we are challenged to make sense of the world we see, to 
theorise and not merely describe. This report outlines a method of analysis using metaphor as a 
thinking tool to interpret findings from a study in education. In the study reported here, metaphor 
provided a means of analysis to delve deeply into the nature of a school system, to offer insights 
and to generate a tentative theory. 
Key Words: Analogy, Metaphor, Qualitative Analysis, and Educational Change 
Introduction 
Research, that genuinely explores the unknown can be messy (Chenail, 1997; Gunstone, White, 
& Fensham, 1988). As researchers, we are challenged to make sense of the mess sense (Chenail, 
1997), to interpret the data and findings by identifying trends and theories to explain and predict. 
Roberts (1996, p. 244) has expressed reservations about research reports, and qualitative research 
in particular. He implies that they are often limited to description where they should create a 
fresh 'conceptual framework ... by understanding and explaining events and phenomena better, 
more deeply and more systematically'. This article outlines a method of qualitative interpretation, 
analogical mapping using metaphor, which aims to provide such conceptual frameworks and to 
facilitate the communication of ideas.  
The metaphors discussed in this report, to illustrate this process of analysis, were used to 
interpret the findings of a case study of a school science department that was attempting change. 
First, the problem associated with analysing the large volume of diverse data produced in 
qualitative research is considered. Second, the case for analogical mapping as a device for 
providing a conceptual framework to interpret research findings is made, by considering analogy 
as a thinking tool and by proposing the use of analogical mapping as a means of interpreting data 
and research findings. Third, the process of analogical analysis is illustrated by its application to 
a case study of a school science department. Finally, the sequence of steps involved in the 
analogical analysis is summarised as an exemplar for application to other research. 
The Problem 
A school science department, eight teachers, was attempting to introduce a constructivist 
approach to its teaching of science. To understand the process of change I investigated the 
influences that affected these teachers as they attempted their change. Data were obtained, over 
more than 15 months. As researcher, I visited the school one day per week for the first eight 
weeks of the study, then four days per week for ten weeks and at least one day per week for the 
remainder of the study. During these visits I recorded observations in and out of science classes, 
interviews and discussions between researcher teachers and students, and collected artifacts. 
These research procedures, applied over a long period, are effective ways of finding out how a 
particular culture (in this case members of this school science culture) views their world. Hence, 
this research could be positioned cognitive anthropology (D'Andrade, 1995).  
The change the teachers were attempting was a shift from a range of individual teaching 
approaches (including transmission and process-led approaches) to a constructivist teaching 
approach, specifically an interactive teaching approach described in Osborne and Freyberg, 
(1985). The way in which the constructivist teaching was in harmony with or discordant with 
these teachers' existing views of science education, and other policies, traditions and practices in 
the school became one focus of the study. The long term and varied techniques of data collection 
resulted in a massive, untidy mess of information, as is often the case in this type of research 
(Gunstone, White, & Fensham, 1988).  
In an attempt to 'make sense' (Chenail, 1997) of this mess and understand the system being 
studied. The data was analysed as recommended by Erickson (1986) to identify influences on the 
attempted change. I mapped all the identified influences and used arrows among these to produce 
a web of interconnecting factors as a diagram. This attempt to describe and explain the function 
of the science education system produced an ever-growing network that graduated from A4 
paper to A3 paper to a sheet of butcher's paper to sheets of butcher's paper stuck on my office 
wall. And, it never satisfactorily explained what was happening. The interconnectedness of all 
the varied factors in the system seemed to defeat this method of description and analysis. (A not 
uncommon experience, it seems, for many PhD students who embark on qualitative research.) 
The network produced was like an incredibly complicated food web where pulling any 'string' in 
the network eventually tugged at every other factor identified. It was a product only the 
researcher could love and one which failed to communicate my ideas to others.  
The interpretation portrayed the complexity but failed to provide new insights to enrich or extend 
existing theory by merely offering 'a degree of complexity but little discovery' the analysis was at 
a low level of qualitative research according to criteria outlined by Kearney (2001, p. 146). I 
sought a different way of analysing and describing the data and findings through analogical 
mapping. Analogical mapping was not determined as the method of analysis a prioi. As argued 
below, however, this means of analysis was well suited to the underlying philosophy and purpose 
of the research that set out to interpret, understand and explain rather than merely describe. Thus 
the method of analysis is consistent with first principles proposed for judging the quality of 
analysis in qualitative research (Drisko, 1997; Garratt & Hodkinson, 1998; Seale, 1999).  
Thinking 
Analogies are valuable thinking tools because they allow unknown phenomena to be understood 
in terms of well know phenomena (Badcock, 1995). In science, for example, analogical 
reasoning is common place, a well respected way of thinking and modelling and often used as a 
device in communication (Dunbar, 1997; Eisenberg, 1992; Gentner et al., 1997; Holyoak & 
Thagard, 1995; Kurtz et al., 1999; Markman & Gentner, 1996). Consider Huygens view of light, 
for example, '(Light) spreads', he wrote, 'As sound does, by spherical surfaces and waves: for I 
call them waves from their resemblance to those which are seen to be formed on water when a 
stone is thrown into it' (cited in Eisenberg, 1992, p.144). Note that in this extract, the similarities 
between water waves and light are mapped one against the other identifying similarities and that 
these mappings provide insight into the nature of light (the unknown) through the well known 
and well understood phenomena of water waves. This analogical reasoning is a 'strong method' 
of reasoning, according to Kurtz et al. (1999), because it makes use of specific or abstract 
represented knowledge but its effectiveness depends on an appropriate source of knowledge 
being present. Thus, availability and selection of an appropriate analogue, as a source of 
knowledge, is critical in analogical analysis.  
Mapping 
Analogy is made up of two parts, the target analogue, which is the domain to be explained, and 
the base analogue, which is the domain that serves as a source of knowledge (Gentner, 1983, 
1989). Both domain and base are analogues, things that are compared. If an analogy is to be 
valuable in producing knowledge, then the worth of the analogy does not lie simply in the overall 
number of similarities between target and base. The central requirement is that "a relational 
structure that normally applies in one domain can be applied in another domain" (Gentner, 1983, 
p. 156). Relational structures are attributes of the base and target that associate a similar causal 
relationship. They reveal a similar process and allow similar interpretations of base and target. 
Analogies may also have literal attributes Gentner (1983, p. 159).  
The difference between a literal and a relational attribute can be illustrated by example. 
Aubusson and Cosgrove (1997) use the analogy of the teacher as nomad. The nomads served as 
the base and the teachers as the target. Consider the following selected attributes of the analogy. 
In the nomads' ritual (Bronowski, 1974), they traverse six rivers and accept high losses in their 
stock as a inevitable consequence of their way of life. Similarly, the teachers studied 'herded' 
their student cohorts through six years of secondary schooling. Each year their students had to 
'traverse exams' and the teachers were tolerant of high rates of failure. The six rivers could be 
considered an attributes equivalent to the six years of secondary schooling but the number of 
obstacles, six, is merely a match of literal features with no explanatory power. By contrast, the 
acceptance of high culls by both the teacher and nomad as part of their way of life, suggests a 
causal relationship, derived from the nomad analogy, about the nature of schooling. The literal 
analogy provides a match that only illustrates a trivial similarity of appearance. By contrast 
relational similarities provide a system of connected knowledge for comparison.  
The exploration of relational similarities allows the process of reasoning to be transferred from 
one domain to another, to infer causes and processes in a target analogue. Relational structures 
provide access to an existing knowledge system in the base. High order mappings (Gentner, 
1983) generate deeper understanding of the target. Such deeper understanding characterises high-
level qualitative research (Kearney, 2001). In analogical mapping, high-level interpretation is 
characterised by mapping relationships, reasoning and argument rather than the mere 
identification of similar attributes in objects. In selecting an analogy for mapping, then, we seek 
a metaphor with extensive relational correspondence rather than simply many similarities.  
The problem of the initial analysis of the data in this research was that it merely described and 
communicated this description poorly. By contrast, analogical mapping provided a means to shift 
to a higher level of qualitative research (Kearney, 2001, p. 148) where interpretation of data 
might 'convey new meaning' or 'reveal something unknown'. Analogical mapping does this not 
by mapping a uncharted landscape but by viewing the landscape in another way, just as 
alternative maps, street maps, topographical maps, relief maps and land use maps reveal and 
explore different features of geography. In this way, it provides one path to 'discovery' - 'the 
presentation by researchers of new perspectives on … human phenomena', as defined by 
Kearney (2001, p.146). 
Analogies can be mapped against phenomena (Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Hesse, 1966) to describe 
and identify: similarities - where there is a correspondence between the phenomena and analogy; 
differences - where the analogy and phenomena under study are fundamentally different; and 
ambiguities - inconclusive areas where the correspondence between analogy and phenomena is 
unclear. Analogical mapping provides a way of bringing an established, well-understood theory 
to bear on data about new situations and events. Gick and Holyoak (1983) recommend that 
analogical mapping be divided into two stages, an initial mapping and a second more extensive 
mapping. The purpose of the initial mapping is to find a analogue with a potential to provide 
insight into the target domain.  
Initial Mapping 
Initial mapping identifies the obvious general features of the phenomena, case or episode under 
study. It then looks for a match between these features in the target and base analogue. When this 
is found, the well-understood base analogue is elaborated in detail. This allows other similarities 
and differences between the target and base to be identified. These steps in analogical mapping 
are illustrated below. 
Initial Mapping 
The purpose of this initial mapping is to find an appropriate analogue to interpret the target (a 
school science department). The general features of the phenomena under study, the school 
science system, were identified (Aubusson, 1998). These were:  
1. Complexity - a huge range of interconnected factors influenced what teachers did as they 
attempted change. 
2. Stasis - despite the attempt to radically change, there was little long term change evident 
in the school. The teachers taught at the end of the study much as they had at the 
beginning, though minor variations emerged. This stasis appeared to result from dynamic 
resistance to change derived from the complex interconnectedness of factors in the 
system.  
3. Unpredicatability and gradual subtle change (later described as evolution).  
Using these features, analogues were sought which might provide insights into the science 
education system. These were then subjected to a first mapping seeking a one to one 
correspondence between these listed features and the analogue. Some were tried and rejected. 
Analogues were sought in chemistry and physics, for example. Le Chatelier's principle was 
mapped against these features of school science and, while it provided insights regarding 
equilibrium, it could not explain the characteristic of unpredictability. Similarly, inertia resulting 
from balanced forces seemed to lack the complexity and dynamism of the school system. An 
analogue was sought in biology because biology provided systems with these difficult to explain 
characteristics, 'living systems are characterised by a remarkably complex organisation ... (with) 
a steady-state balance in spite of much input and output. This homeostasis is made possible by 
elaborate feedback mechanisms, unknown in their precision in any inanimate system' (Mayr, 
1988, p. 14). Thus a biological analogy suggested a potential to shift from models based on 
'simple cause and effect to … thinking dealing with complex interactions' (Kelly, 1994, p. 2).  
Homeostasis is built upon the connectedness within a biological system (a connectedness evident 
in the school system under study) and the ultimate level of biological 'organisation' is the 
ecosystem. In Miller's (1975) description of ecosystem, he identified the very factors identified 
in this case study of the school system: complexity, stasis, variation and, paradoxically, gradual 
change. In an ecosystem) everything is connected to everything; everything feeds back through 
the ecosystem on itself. The interconnectedness preserves the overall system. The natural 
tendency of any complex ... ecosystem is to maintain a dynamic steady state despite 
environmental stresses, changes and shocks. Even where stresses are too great ... a biotic 
community can evolve a new steady state in balance with changed environmental conditions (p. 
77). This initial mapping revealed a good relational match and this suggested that an ecosystem 
might be a fruitfully explored as the base in an extended analogical analysis of the case study. 
Detailed Mapping 
Having established the one to one correspondence in this first mapping of general features, the 
next stage was a move to a more detailed mapping by mapping the school science system against 
an elaborate representation of an ecosystem. The purpose of this is to use what we know about an 
ecosystem to inform our interpretation of the school system. As a heath ecosystem was well 
known to me it provided a well-understood analogical base from which to identify attributes of 
an ecosystem. These attributes were identified and refined by eliminating literal similarities to 
expose similarities with potential as 'relational structures' (Gentner, 1983). That is, overlaps were 
sought which may reveal matching, causal relationships in the base that might be transferred to 
the target. Potential, relational features of the heath ecosystem (Aubusson, 1998) are stated 
briefly below: 
• Complexity of interactions in that there are the many interrelationships among plants, 
animals and their surroundings. 
• Homeostasis such as the heath's capacity for self-maintenance and perpetuation in spite 
of stresses. 
• Succession where over a long time communities change their environment making it 
more suited to other types communities than themselves. Different stages of succession 
are present in different parts of the ecosystem at the same time. 
• Fitness such as a sundew's carnivorous adaptation to impoverished soil. 
• Generation - regeneration, in that the heath ecosystem generates itself from within 
through succession and regenerates itself in response to fire. 
• Opportunism when for example the house mouse exploits the short term plentiful food 
and altered environment after fire resulting in a rapid growth in population. 
• Reproductive maturity in that species, if they are to survive, have to pass on information 
present in their genetic code to successive generations. 
• Fragility when changes in the frequency of fire can eliminate species. 
• Evolution as organisms have evolved through natural selection of variations, generating 
fitter species. 
• Purpose in that the organisms function as if there is an unconscious purpose, the survival 
of the species [after Plotkin, 1994] through such adaptations as the Banksia's production 
of nectar 'to' attract animals 'to' pollinate its followers. 
• Knowledge present in the gene pool [after Plotkin, 1994] which enables it to respond to 
its environment).  
This outline of ecosystem brings to the fore biological propositions of adaptation, evolution and 
interactions among organisms and their environment, These characteristics, paradoxically, 
maintain robust stasis but allow, fragile, unpredictable change. 
These attributes of this ecosystem were then mapped onto the case study to identify the 
similarities, differences and ambiguities (after Hess, 1966). For the purposes of this paper, which 
only uses the case study to illustrate the method of analysis, only two mappings will be 
considered in brief. The first attribute, complexity, is a relational similarity, the second, purpose, 
illustrates ambiguity. These examples show how the well-known analogue provides an extensive 
knowledge base to interpret the case under study. 
Complexity  
This school science system is complex. The complexity could be seen in many different 
interacting features of the school's science education system. There were interactions among the 
following: the teachers competing views of purposes, teaching and learning; the different official 
(state syllabus and school program), taught and learned curricula; aspects of conflicting 
teaching/learning paradigms such as behaviourism, constructivism, objectivism and inquiry; the 
tension between the learning a set of science processes and knowledge acquisition; and aspects 
of school, science department and teacher practices unsympathetic to constructivism, such as 
methods of assessment and reporting. These complex interactions operated across organisational 
levels (state, school, science department and class) paradigms (views of teaching learning and 
teaching); and purposes (evident in teachers views, school programs and State syllabus). These 
complex interactions maintained the conditions such that little changed. The constructivist 
change teachers sought was counteracted by dynamic interactions in the complex system 
including: assessment processes emphasising the measurement of accurate recall rather than the 
social and individual construction of knowledge; the organisation of learning in fixed blocks of 
time rather than fexibility recognising that students have different backgrounds and capacities 
which, among other things, led to students requiring different amounts of time to learn; and 
remnants of behaviourism, such as learning described in terms of behavioural objectives, which 
reduced the indicators of cognition to simple predicted behaviours. The interconnectedness of 
these features produced a steady state system, stable and resistant to change.  
Purpose 
The teachers revealed that they held many purposes for science education which arise from 
competing pressures. These included that students, learn to think, learn science facts, work things 
out for themselves, learn process skills, appreciate science, perform well in exams etc. These 
purposes are eclectic and not always consistent with each other. By contrast, the ecosystem 
functions as if it has a single purpose. The organisms function as if their purpose is to ensure 
survival of the species. This notion of purpose in evolution has been contentious among 
biologists, according to Williams (1993) and Ayala (1993). Yet, natural selection serves a 
purpose (Ayala, 1993; Williams, 1993) though the preferred terminology for purpose is teleology 
or teleomy rather than purpose. Williams (1993) explains 
...the designation of something as the means or mechanism for a certain goal or function or 
purpose will imply that the machinery involved was fashioned by selection for the goal attributed 
to it... This is a convention in general use already, perhaps unconsciously ... Thus I would say 
that reproduction and dispersal are the goals or functions or purposes of apples and that the apple 
is a means or mechanism by which such goals are realised by the apple trees. (pp.182-183) 
The organisms in the heath ecosystem survive because everything that happens serves this 
survival imperative; for instance, setting seeds and growth responses to fire. This singular 
purpose, survival, in the heath seems to distinguish it from the science education system where 
the purposes identified in the case study are many and intentional. In purpose, the relationship 
between the analogue and this school science system seems inconclusive and requires further 
consideration. 
Consider the three types of teleology in biology identified by Ayala (1993, pp.189-190). The first 
of these, intended teleology, is actions or objects that are purposeful in that the end state is 
consciously intended by an agent (for example, a person mowing a lawn or a lion pack hunting 
antelope). In the second, there is artificial teleology where objects are the result of purposeful 
behaviour (for example, a bird's nest or a knife). The third is natural teleology, in which features 
are not the result of the intended, purposeful action of an agent but natural process (for example, 
the wings of birds which serve an end, flying). 
Purpose, an apparently inconclusive feature of the mapping, seems in the school science system 
to be intended but in the heath to be natural. However, like the adaptations in the heath, this 
school science system is also a natural teleology. If the purpose of education is to promote the 
survival of the human species through the transfer and development of knowledge across 
generations (and extended nurturing among humans has long been considered an adaptation by 
biologists) then science education (a part of this nurturing survival strategy) is a natural 
teleology. In purpose, there is a contentious parallel between this science education and the heath 
ecosystem analogue. In biology, natural selection, through courtship, has resulted in 
characteristics that are, other than in courtship, disadvantageous. Consider for example, the 
oversized tail feathers of the peacock, the huge antlers of the extinct Irish elk and the excessive 
bulk of the male sea lion. Has schooling similarly gradually evolved through selection to develop 
characteristics fundamentally inimical to its teleological purpose? For example, have its testing 
regimes, rigid timetables and timelines and packed curriculum evolved for sound reasons, such 
as ensuring rigorous education but might they inhibit the teleological, purpose - learning?  
There may be some relational parallel that informs our understanding of schooling. However, the 
multiplicity of sub-purposes and the pre-eminence of intended purposes in the school science 
system, which may not contribute to this primary drive for survival, are not consistent with the 
ecosystem analogy. Analogy Conclusion  
Mapping the heath ecosystem analogy onto the school science system identified relational 
similarities (e.g., complexity) and contentious features (e.g., purpose) and has resulted in an 
ecological model of stasis and change in education (Aubusson, 1998) Some similarities 
identified in the analysis provided insights into the functioning of school science and had 
implications for research. In particular, the ecological notions of reproductive maturity, 
adaptation and fragility can explain the varied impacts of attempted innovation in school science. 
Specifically, a 'new' teaching approach might thrive for a short time in a trial school, if supported 
by sufficient energy or in exploitation of opportunity, but it is unlikely to survive in the long 
term. Analogically, a new teaching approach is an exotic species, which has not evolved in the 
school to which it is introduced. It is less well adapted to the existing environment than are the 
established 'species', practices and procedures. It rarely reaches reproductive maturity, a point at 
which the ideas and practices are dispersed among other teachers and in other schools. It may 
flourish briefly but it is fragile and usually dies (Aubusson, 1998). In this article, the nature of 
purpose in an ecosystem has resulted a consideration of the purpose of schooling and raised 
questions about how the fundamental purpose may be derailed as a result of 'natural' selection.  
Trusting Analogy 
Although well established as way of thinking and interpreting the world, the formal application 
of analogical mapping in qualitative research in the social sciences is atypical. Hence an 
important consideration is how the trustworthiness and quality of analogical analysis may be 
judged. This is considered in detail in Aubusson (1998). I consider trustworthiness here to assert 
the quality of this research (as required by Drisko, 1997; Garratt & Hodkinson, 1998; Seale, 
1999) but also to promote discussion on this novel method of analysis.  
First, recognise that in this research, analogical mapping initially interprets principal findings and 
only then raw data sets. Thus a first step in establishing the worth of the analogical mapping 
depends on the same principles or criteria for collecting and analysing data outlined in the many 
articles and books on qualitative research (e.g., Drisko, 1987; Garratt & Hodkinson, 1998; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Seale, 1999). This paper does not set out to provide a 'complete' report 
(after Drisko, 1997) of the data or research project. Rather it deals primarily with analogical. In 
early sections of this paper the principles guiding the selection and testing of the analogy against 
data and findings have been outlined. The reader is perhaps best placed to make a judgement on 
the value of the analysis based on this research report and its relevance to other settings (Seale, 
1999). Nevertheless, researchers should make explicit their reasons for their interpretive 
judgements and provide evidence that these judgements have been subjected to scrutiny (Garratt 
& Hodkinson, 1998). Here, I will limit the discussion to just two strategies related to judging the 
worth of the analogical mapping (by means other than testing for its consistency and 
inconsistency with research data and findings, which has already been discussed). These two 
strategies are checking by participants, peers and experts; and interpreting other cases. 
Expert, Peer, and Participant Checking 
Analogical mapping sets out to communicate ideas and render phenomena more understandable. 
It follows that 'good' analogical mapping should help others to make sense of the phenomena 
under study. I set out to scrutinise the extent to which this was achieved as part of the research 
process by discussing data and my analysis with peers in a university research group, experts in 
science education and change, reporting the interpretation to the teachers involved in the study 
and reporting the analytical interpretation to meetings of other science teachers and academics. 
This procedure provided a check on the interpretation by those who shared direct knowledge of 
the phenomena, the teachers in the school studied, as well as those with knowledge of similar 
contexts, other teachers, members of the research groups and academics at conferences. The 
overwhelming response of these was the recognition of features of this analogy in their own 
contexts. Where criticisms were raised or alternative interpretations were suggested these were 
explored and tested against data and findings. The discussion of 'purpose' outlined in this paper 
was the result of one such criticism; a criticism which had to be tested against the data by 
looking for confirming and contradictory instances. Thus, one test of 'goodness' is peer review 
both by experts and participants in the research and evidence that alternative interpretations and 
criticism have been examined in light of data and findings. 
Interpreting Other Cases 
If the ecological interpretation is to be useful it needs to have relevance in settings other than that 
studied. One of my main concerns about the analogy was that it predicted both stagnation and the 
potential for radical change. Yet the metaphor was derived from a case characterised by 
stagnation and little change. In the ecological view proposed, organisms and particularly humans 
change aspects of their environment. (The first life on earth altered the atmosphere, plants 
change the moisture and organic content of soil, beavers build dams and humans shape the 
environment to meet needs and exploit opportunity.) So far, this ecological interpretation might 
suggest that the school and ecosystem only prevent change by selecting species/ideas that fit and 
maintain the existing system. However, the metaphor also suggests that change does, has and 
will occur. 
In this research, the analogy was tested by reinterpreting findings of two well researched projects 
where significant change in the teaching of science had been reported, the Project to Enhance 
Effective Learning (PEEL) (see Baird & Mitchell, 1986; Baird & Northfield, 1992) and the 
Learning in Science Project (LISP) (see Bell, 1993; Bell & Gilbert, 1996). The interpretation of 
these two other cases is reported in detail in Aubusson (1998) and briefly in Aubusson and 
Cosgrove (1997) where it was concluded that the ecosystem metaphor, through introduced 
species and the application of energy and resources, could explain radical change as well as 
stagnation in a school system.  
Limitations 
There are many different ways of interpreting and reporting research. I do not assert that all 
research be analysed analogically. Indeed, all data and findings do not lend themselves to 
analogy. A well understood base analogue may not be available as a source of established theory. 
Even where available it may prove unproductive. Note that in this research a number of 
unproductive anologues were tried. When seeking dense, descriptions analogical mapping is not 
a substitute for phenomenology, phemoneography, narrative, and evocative or fictional accounts. 
Analogical analogy comes after initial analysis and reporting to provide another means of 
analysis and an alternative way to view the phenomena under study. Where the researcher is 
satisfied with the explanation yielded by other methods and judges that the outcomes of the 
research are evident and readily communicated then analogical analysis may be unnecessary. 
However, where a more parsimonious explanation is sought and clear grounded theory proves 
difficult to generate, analogical mapping provides a way of bringing established knowledge to 
bear on the problem. It provides another layer to interpret, communicate and increase 
understanding of human contexts. Used without a thorough, initial interpretation of the data, it is 
just as likely to mislead as to provide insights. 
Qualitative researchers are usually very sensitive to the context bound nature of their research 
and findings, often leaving it to the reader to judge their applicability to other contexts (Seale, 
1999). Yet, transferability is often important to consumers of research who want to make use of 
grounded knowledge in other settings (Drisko, 1997). In this research the metaphor was tested 
against two other similar cases. These two cases were selected for specific reasons, first they 
were dissimilar to the case under study in that they reported radical change but they were very 
similar to the case examined in this research in that they were promoting a very similar 
constructivist approach, in similar secondary schools, in similar settings. The use of metaphor (in 
this study, school science as ecosystem,) identifies key relational similarities between two sets of 
information. This brings to the fore features, principles, perhaps a comprehensive theory 
explaining data and findings. For example, aspects of evolutionary theory and ecology are 
tentatively proposed as a way to understand observations of school science in one school - one 
context, one setting. The metaphor provides a set of propositions that can then be considered in 
other settings. Discussions with researchers in the field of science education and educational 
change, as well as the examination of two other cases, indicate that the ecological metaphor 
provides an effective device for the communication of ideas. Many researchers have commented 
that they recognise that a similar interpretation has relevance to educational settings they have 
studied. However, further research is required before asserting any broad application to other 
examples of science education and attempted change. 
Conclusion 
Analogical mapping provided a means of interpreting the findings of a qualitative study and gave 
rise to unexpected insights into the nature of school science. Although analogical mapping need 
not rigidly follow a set of steps, the sequence of analysis in this study can be summarised as: 
1. The key, general features of the target domain are identified. Here, the key features of the 
school case study were identified as complexity, stasis, and evolution.  
2. A well understood base analogue is sought. Here it was sought in a range of disciplines 
including biology. 
3. The target and base are compared to test for a match of the key general features. This is 
called the initial mapping. 
4. The well understood base anaolgue, here the ecosystem, is then teased out in detail to 
identify its salient attributes.  
5. The base is then used to interpret the target domain seeking similar, different and 
ambiguous relationships. Literal attributes are discarded. In this case the detailed 
attributes of a (heath) ecosystem are tested for a match in the school case study. This is 
called the detailed mapping. This purpose of this step is to provide new ways of thinking 
about or a conceptual framework for theorising about the case under study. 
6. The analysis provides a conclusion. In short it answers the question, what do we now 
know about the case under study that we did not know before?  
The analogical mapping not only rendered the data and system more understandable but also 
yielded a model, the ecosystem (well established in biology) to explain the nature of science 
education. It may suggest a theory of how 'sustainable change in school science might be 
achieved based on principles of ecology principles (Aubusson, 2002). Finally, it allows 
predictions, for example,  
• that science education might progress through succession resulting in a mosaic of 
different forms of science education in different locations; and  
• that as the science education ecosystem responds to change (however well intentioned) it 
may be expected to suffer degradation as well as progression, just as an ecosystem does.  
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